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THE DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: HOW
CONGRESS SAID "NO" TO FULL FAITH AND
CREDIT AND THE CONSTITUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
It is estimated that ten percent of the human population
is homosexual.' Based upon 1990 census figures,' potentially
2.5 million people will be affected by the Defense of Marriage
Act ("DOMA").' DOMA was enacted in September of 1996 to
permit states to disregard the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the United States Constitution in the event that same sex
marriage became legal in any state.4
The debate over same sex marriage actually began over
twenty-five years ago in Minnesota,5 but the fury erupted in
Hawaii with the 1993 Baehr v. Lewin decision.6 In Baehr,
three same sex couples were denied the right to marry by the
State of Hawaii.7 However, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled
that the state's failure to issue a marriage license amounted
to sex discrimination.' The case was remanded to determine
if Hawaii had a compelling reason for refusing to issue the
couples' marriage licenses.9
Although the Hawaiian courts had not made a final judi-
cial determination regarding same sex marriage, the United
States Congress decided not to wait for the outcome and en-
1. According to the Kinsey report, 37% of the male population has had
some homosexual experience, 13% has had more homosexual than heterosexual
experience, and 4% were exclusively homosexual. HOMOSEXUAL-
ITY/HETEROSEXUALITY 1 (David P. McWhirter, et al. eds., 1990). The numbers
were similar, but lower, for women. Id. For purposes of this comment, and for
ease of calculation, the author uses the common belief that 10% of the popula-
tion is homosexual.
2. The total population of the United States in 1990 was 248,709,873.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
POPULATION AND HOUSING 2 (1993).
3. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996); see discussion infra
Part II.B.1.
4. See discussion infra Part II.B.1-2.
5. See Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); see also discussion
infra Part II.A. 1.
6. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
7. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 49.
8. Id. at 60; see discussion infra Part II.A.2.
9. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68; see discussion infra Part II.A.2.
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acted DOMA. ° Congress believed that under the second sen-
tence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause" it had the power
to enact legislation that would allow states to choose whether
to recognize a same sex marriage. 2
This comment explores the ruling in Baehr v. Lewin"
and Congress' reaction to it-the enactment of DOMA. 4 Af-
ter discussing Congress' reasoning for enacting DOMA, 5 the
background section continues with a discussion of the history
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, including the Framers'
intent to ensure that all acts and judgments be recognized by
sister states. 6 How the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Full Faith and Credit Clause is also addressed. 7 The back-
ground concludes by discussing the "effects clause" of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and its judicial interpretation. 8
Previous legislation Congress has enacted under the effects
clause will also be explored. 9
After identifying the problem of whether Congress has
the power to allow states to give no effect to a sister state's
acts or judgments," the analysis explores the constitutional-
ity of DOMA, and argues that it is unconstitutional.2' The
author asserts that DOMA is unconstitutional as it violates
the Framers' intent2' and because Congress has no power to
enact legislation that limits the effect of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause. Finally, this comment proposes that if Con-
gress wants to enact legislation which allows states to disre-
gard the Constitution, the only way it can be done is through
10. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 5. DOMA was enacted on Sept. 21, 1996, 28
U.S.C. § 1738C (1996), while the Baehr remand was not decided until December
3, 1996, Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *1 (Haw. Cir.
Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
11. The second sentence reads, "And Congress may by general laws pre-
scribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof." U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1.
12. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
13. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see also discussion infra Part II.A.2.
14. See discussion infra Part II.B.1-2.
15. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
16. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
17. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
18. See discussion infra Part II.C.3-4.
19. See discussion infra Part II.C.5.
20. See discussion infra Part III.
21. See discussion infra Part IV.
22. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
23. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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the constitutional amendment process.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Same Sex Marriage
1. The Early Years
The first shots were fired in the debate surrounding
same sex marriage over twenty-five years ago in Baker v.
Nelson.25 In 1971, two Minnesota men applied for a marriage
license with the county clerk of Hennepin. 26 The application
was denied because the applicants were of the same sex."
The men filed suit, claiming denial of their First, Eighth, and
Ninth Amendment rights.28 Additionally, they claimed that
the refusal to issue a marriage license to two members of the
same sex violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process
and equal protection guarantees.29
On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court upheld a lower
court ruling which refused to issue the license. ° The court
believed that the constitutional arguments raised lacked
merit and refused to change the commonly understood
meaning of "marriage.
In the years since 1971, several other claimants brought
the issue of the right to marry a member of the same sex be-
fore courts across the country. 2 None were successful in
gaining the fundamental right to marry;3 however, claimants
in Hawaii might be the first to succeed. 4
24. See discussion infra Part V. This comment is not concerned with any
religious, moral, social, or equal protection arguments that may be raised by
same sex marriages. The exclusive focus of this comment is on Congress' power
under the Constitution to enact legislation prohibiting same sex marriage.
25. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971).
26. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 186 n.2.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 185.
31. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185-86 (finding that the common understanding of
marriage meant a union between persons of the opposite sex).
32. See De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (same sex
marriage not recognized); Murphy v. State of Texas, 653 S.W.2d 567 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1983) (same sex marriage not recognized); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187
(Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (no right to same sex marriage).
33. See supra note 32.
34. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see infra Part II.A.2.
1998]
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2. The Baehr v. Lewin Decision
In its landmark decision of Baehr v. Lewin," the Hawaii
Supreme Court stepped up the debate over same sex mar-
riage." For the first time in history, it appears that same sex
couples may be allowed to legally marry."
In Baehr, three same sex couples filed suit in a Hawaii
circuit court against the Director of the Department of
Health ("DOH") for refusing to issue them marriage li-
censes. 8 While Hawaii's marriage statute does not specifi-
cally deny same sex marriages, 9 the DOH interpreted the
35. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44.
36. As a reaction to the Hawaii decision, many States have passed laws
banning same sex marriage. Henry J. Reske, A Matter of Full Faith: Legisla-
tors Scramble to Bar Recognition of Gay Marriages, 82 A.B.A. J., July 1996, at
32. As of this writing, these states are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013
(Michie 1996); Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 (West Supp. 1997); Ar-
kansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie Supp. 1997); Delaware, DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (Michie Supp. 1996); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.212
(West Supp. 1998); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Michie Supp. 1997);
Idaho, IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (1996); Illinois, 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/212 (West
Supp. 1996); Indiana, IND. CODE § 31-7-1-2 (1987 & 1996 Supp.); Kansas, KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1997 Supp.); Louisiana, LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West
Supp. 1998); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 701 (1998); Michigan, MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271 (West Supp. 1997); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.03 (West Supp. 1998); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. 1972 93-1-1 (1997);
Missouri, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 451.022 (Vernon's 1997); Montana, MONT. CODE
ANN. § 40-1-401 (1997); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (1996); North
Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-08 (1997); Oklahoma, 43 OKLA. STAT. ANN.
3.1 (West Supp. 1998); Pennsylvania, 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West
Supp. 1998); South Carolina, S.C. CODE § 20-1-15 (West Supp. 1997); South
Dakota, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie Supp. 1997); Tennessee, TENN.
CODE. ANN. § 36-3-113 (1996); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1995); Virginia,
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie Supp. 1997); and Washington, WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 26.04.010 (West 1997). One State, Alabama, has banned same sex
marriage by executive order; Gov. Fob James signed the order on August 30,
1996. See Joan Biskupic & John E. Yang, Gay Marriage Is Allowed by Hawaii
Court; Trial Judge Says Ban Fails Key Test Under State Constitution, WASH.
POST, Dec. 4, 1996, at Al.
37. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 68. Hawaii has since enacted a domestic partners
law which would give same sex couples some rights, including medical insur-
ance and survivorship rights. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1, et. seq. (1998). Ha-
waii has also placed on the 1998 ballot a constitutional amendment that would
ban marriage between members of the same sex. See Guy Kelly, Gay Marriage
Suit in Hawaii Prompts Colorado Legislature, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb.
11, 1998, at 22A.
38. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 49-50.
39. Id. at 50. Hawaii's marriage statute contains gender based language
that led the DOH to interpret the statute to apply only to opposite sex couples.
HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1 (1993).
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statute to apply only to opposite sex couples. 40 The Circuit
Court dismissed the plaintiffs' action for failure to state a
claim upon which relief could be granted.41
On appeal to the Hawaii Supreme Court, the appellants
argued that the DOH's interpretation and application of Ha-
waii's marriage statute violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Hawaii Constitution.42 Hawaii's Equal Protection
Clause provides, in pertinent part, that "[n]o person shall
be ... denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be
discriminated against in the exercise thereof because
of... sex ....,,43
The Hawaii Supreme Court held that while same sex
couples had no fundamental right to marry, the Hawaii
Equal Protection Clause had been violated.44 The court be-
lieved that the refusal to issue a marriage license to a same
sex couple amounted to sex discrimination and, therefore, the
Hawaii marriage statute was presumptively unconstitutional
on its face and as applied by the DOH.45 However, the stat-
ute would be deemed constitutional if, under a strict scrutiny
analysis, the DOH could show a compelling reason for the dif-
ference in treatment between same sex and opposite sex cou-
ples.46 The case was remanded to determine that issue.47
On remand, the circuit court found the reasons offered by
the DOH for the difference in treatment between same sex
and opposite sex couples, including protecting traditional
marriage, were not compelling.48 The court found that the
failure to issue a marriage license amounted to sex discrimi-
nation.49 The possibility that same sex couples could soon le-
gally marry in Hawaii prompted other states to enact legisla-
40. Baehr v. Lewin, 825 P.2d 44, 51-52 (Haw. 1993).
41. Id. at 52.
42. Id. at 50.
43. HAW. CONST. art. I, § 5 (1978).
44. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
45. Id.
46. Id. The strict scrutiny test would be satisfied if Hawaii could show that
"the statute's sex-based classification is justified by compelling state interests
and... the statute is narrowly drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgments of the
applicant couples' constitutional rights." Id.
47. Id. at 68.
48. Baehr v. Miike, CIV. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-*19 (Haw.
Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). Before the Hawaii Circuit Court heard arguments on
remand, Miike became the director of the DOH and was automatically substi-
tuted for Lewin. Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 n.1 (Haw. 1996).
49. Baehr, 1996 WL 694235, at *22.
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tion banning same sex marriage."
B. Reaction to Baehr
1. The Congressional Response to Same Sex Marriage
In response to Baehr, Congress enacted DOMA.5' DOMA
has two purposes: (1) "to defend the institution of traditional
heterosexual marriage," and (2) "to protect the right of the
States to formulate their own public policy regarding same
sex unions, free from any federal constitutional implica-
tions." 2
DOMA allows states, if they so choose, to refuse to rec-
ognize a valid same sex marriage performed in another
state." It reads in pertinent part:
No State... shall be required to give effect to any public
act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State ... respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of
such other State ... or a right or claim arising from such a
relationship.54
In the House of Representatives report on DOMA, Con-
gress emphasized the narrowness of the Act.5 According to
the report, DOMA "merely provides that ... other states will
not be obligated or required" to recognize a same sex mar-
riage, or a right or claim arising from a same sex marriage,
performed elsewhere.56 Under DOMA, states are still free to
recognize same sex marriages, but are not required to if they
decide that doing so violates their public policy. 7
2. DOMA's Reasoning
In the House Report on DOMA, Congress indicated that
the reason for enacting DOMA was because the campaign for
50. See supra note 36.
51. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
52. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905,
2906.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
54. Id. DOMA also defines marriage for federal purposes as "a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife." Defense of Marriage
Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
55. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 25
56. Id.
57. Id. at 27.
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same sex marriage was an "assault being waged against tra-
ditional heterosexual marriage by gay rights groups and their
lawyers." 8 Additionally, Congress found that gay rights ac-
tivists considered a victory in Hawaii to be only the "first step
in a national effort to win.., the right to same sex mar-
riage."" The primary means gay rights activists were going
to use to win the right to marriage was the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution. °
Since it appeared other states might have to recognize
same sex marriages performed in Hawaii under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause,61 Congress deemed it necessary to
enact legislation that would allow States to formulate their
own public policy towards same sex marriage and to choose
whether to recognize them. 2 In its report, Congress found
that while there is a judicially recognized public policy excep-
tion to the Full Faith and Credit Clause, which would allow
States to disregard same sex marriages performed else-
where,63 federal action was necessary because the public pol-
icy exception "is far from certain." 4 DOMA was meant to
clear up the "complicated issue" of whether States must rec-
65
ognize a valid same sex marriage from another state.
Congress, relying on language in the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, decided that by not requiring states to recog-
nize same sex marriages, but allowing them to do so if they
choose, would not run afoul of the Constitution. DOMA takes
the Full Faith and Credit Clause out of the debate and lets
58. Id. at 2-3.
59. Id. at 7.
60. Id. (citing a memorandum written by Evan Wolfson, Director of the
Marriage Project for Lambda Legal Defense Fund, a gay rights legal organiza-
tion, entitled Winning an Keeping Equal Marriage Rights: What Will Follow
Victory in Baehr v. Lewin?, outlining the strategy gay rights organizations in-
tend to pursue in the fight for same sex marriage). The memorandum was in-
cluded in the report of the May 15, 1996 hearing before the House Judiciary
Subcommittee on the Constitution. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 7 n.19.
61. U.S. CONST. art. IV; see infra Part II.C.
62. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 9-10.
63. Id.; see Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979) (finding the Full Faith and
Credit Clause does not require one State to recognize another State's law in
violation of its own public policy).
64. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 9.
65. Id. at 2. Congress noted that since no State has ever recognized same
sex marriages, there is a "significant legal uncertainty" as to how the courts
would rule on the issue. Id. at 25.
66. See infra Parts II.C.1, II.C.3.
1998] 945
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each State decide the issue of same sex marriage "free from
the threat of constitutional compulsion."67 The House Report
indicates that, under the Effects Clause of the Article IV of
the Constitution,68 "Congress is empowered to specify by
statute how States are to treat laws from other States."69
DOMA would be constitutional because Congress has
"discretionary power to carve out such exceptions as it deems
appropriate"" under the Effects Clause."7 Congress deemed
the threat to traditional heterosexual marriage-that one
State would soon force its non-traditional definition of mar-
riage on another-significant enough to trigger this exception
under the clause. 2
Before reaching the issue of whether Congress has the
authority to act under the Full Faith and Credit Clause in
this way, it is necessary to first look to the history and pur-
pose of the clause itself.
73
C. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
1. History of the Clause
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 74 as it appears in the
Constitution, is not the same clause that was proposed for
adoption. The clause as proposed for adoption read:
[flull faith and credit ought to be given in each state to the
public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other
state, and the Legislature shall by general laws prescribe
the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings
shall be proved, and the effect which judgments obtained
in one state, shall have in another.75
After some debate, the clause was amended with
"thereof' being substituted for "which judgments obtained in
67. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 17.
68. U.S. CONST. art. IV, §1; see infra note 78.
69. Id. at 26.
70. Id. at 25.
71. See infra Part II.C.3.
72. H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 26, 27.
73. In addition to whether Congress has the power to act under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the notion of separation of powers may also be impli-
cated.
74. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
75. WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 255 (1987) (emphasis added).
946 [Vol. 38
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one state, shall have in another."76  A further amendment
substituted "shall" for "ought to" on the effect states must
give to sister state judgments, and "may" for "shall" on the
legislature's ability to implement the clause."
These amendments bring us to the form that became Ar-
ticle IV of the Constitution. The clause reads, "flull faith
and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, rec-
ords, and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the
Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which
such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved, and the
effect thereof."
78
The change is important because "[t]he language is posi-
tive, and declaratory, leaving nothing to future legislation."
79
The requirement of full faith and credit is "declared, and es-
tablished by the constitution itself, and is to receive no aid,
nor is it susceptible of any qualification by congress."8° The
Framers did not intend the States to give another State's
judgments or acts some faith and credit, "but full faith and
credit, that is, to attribute to them positive and absolute ver-
ity, so that they cannot be contradicted, or the truth of them
be denied, any more than in the state, where they origi-
nated."8 One commentator has noted that the change made
the clause "self executing, commanding full faith and credit
in the constitutional text and making congressional action
discretionary, instead of commanding congressional action
and leaving the clause dependent on implementation of the
command to Congress.""
The United States Supreme Court has also interpreted
the intent of the Framers and the meaning of the Full Faith
76. Id. at 256.
77. Id.
78. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. The Committee on Style made two changes to
the clause before it became part of the Constitution. MEIGS, supra note 75, at
256. The first was to substitute "Congress" for "Legislature." Id. The second
was to break the clause into two sentences. Id.
79. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution 3, in 4 THE FOUNDERS
CONSTITUTION 484, 485 (Philip B. Kurland et al. eds., 1987). Joseph Story was
a Supreme Court Justice from 1811 until his death in 1845. CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW at xci (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 3d ed. 1996).
80. STORY, supra note 80, at 485.
81. Id.
82. Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 292
(1992).
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and Credit Clause.83
2. Judicial Interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause
In Williams v. North Carolina,4 the Supreme Court
found the very purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
was "to alter the status of the several states as independent
foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created
under the laws or judicial proceedings of the others, and to
make them integral parts of a single nation."" The Court
proceeded, mandating "not some but full faith and credit" be
given to judgments.86
In Johnson v. Muelberger,7 the Court found the clause
was intended by the Framers "to help weld the independent
states into a nation by giving judgments within the jurisdic-
tion of the rendering state the same faith and credit in sister
states as they have in the state of the original forum."88 "This
constitutional purpose promotes unification, not centraliza-
tion."9 Additionally, the faith and credit that is to be given is
nothing short of "full." °
In addition to requiring full faith, the Full Faith and
Credit Clause enables Congress to enact legislation under the
clause."'
3. The "Effects Clause"
While the first sentence of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause requires states to give full credit to each others judg-
ments, the second sentence allows Congress to prescribe the
effect states must give a sister states' judgments or acts.92 It
reads: "[a]nd the Congress may by general laws prescribe the
manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be
83. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
84. 317 U.S. 287 (1942) (dealing with the recognition one state must give to
another state's divorce).
85. Williams, 317 U.S. at 295 (quoting Milwaukee County v. M.E. White
Co., 296 U.S. 268, (1935)).
86. Id. at 294. (quoting Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32 (1938)).
87. 340 U.S. 581 (1951) (requiring a state to give full faith and credit to an
out-of-state divorce).
88. Johnson, 340 U.S. at 584.
89. Id. at 585.
90. Id. at 584.
91. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see infra Part II.C.3.
92. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
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proved, and the effect thereof."9" This section of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, the Effects Clause, allows Congress
to enact "supplementary and enforcing legislation."94 The ef-
fects clause allows for legislation as to how judgments are to
be authenticated, and the effect of judgments, once authenti-
cated, so "full faith and credit are given to them."95
4. Judicial Interpretation of the Effects Clause
The Supreme Court has not decided the issue of whether
Congress has the power to create exceptions to the Full Faith
and Credit Clause by using the effects clause. However, Jus-
tice Stone, in his dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough,96
noted "[t]he mandatory force of the full faith and credit
clause as defined by [the] Court may be, in some degrees not
yet fully defined, expanded or contracted by Congress. "97
Stone believed that Congress would have the power to limit
the amount of full faith given; otherwise, the effects clause
"would have been quite unnecessary. " "9
However, in Williams v. North Carolina,99 the Court ex-
pressed "no view" on whether Congress has the power to limit
the effect of full faith and credit. °° The Court noted that
Congress, "in its sweeping requirement that judgments of the
courts of one state be given full faith and credit in the courts
of another ... ," has never sought to limit the effect of the
clause.... "[T]he considerable interests involved and the sub-
stantial and far reaching effects which the allowance of an
exception would have on innocent persons indicate that the
purpose of the full faith and credit clause and of the sup-
porting legislation would be thwarted ... ,,102
93. Id.
94. EDWARD CORWIN, The "Full Faith and Credit" Clause, 81 U. PA. L. REV.
371, 373 (1933).
95. STORY, supra note 79, at 485-86.
96. 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause to a di-
vorce decree and child support).
97. Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 215 n.2. (Stone, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
100. Williams, 317 U.S. at 303. The Court was responding directly to Justice
Stone's dissent in Yarborough. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 303-04.
1998] 949
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
5. Congress Acts Under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause
Congress has used its power to legislate under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause several times, °3 the first of which
was in 1790 when it enacted the Full Faith and Credit Act. 0
4
The current version of the Full Faith and Credit Act reads in
part: "[s]uch acts, records and judicial proceedings.., so
authenticated, shall have the same full faith and credit in
every court within the United States... as they have by law
or usage in the courts of such state.., from which they are
taken. ,0 5
In 1980, Congress again used its power under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause to amend the Full Faith and Credit
Act by adding The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
("Parental Act").0 6 The Parental Act reads, "every State shall
enforce according to its terms ... any child custody determi-
nation made consistently with the provisions of this section
by a court of another State."0 7 The reason for the addition
was because Congress found child custody determinations
were not being accorded the full faith and credit treatment
they deserved.0 8 One of the purposes of the Parental Act was
"to avoid jurisdictional competition and conflict between state
courts." ' 9
In 1994, Congress again amended the Full Faith and
Credit Act by adding the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Orders Act ("Child Support Act")."0 The Child Sup-
port Act requires that states "enforce according to its terms a
child support order made consistently with this section by a
court of another State. ... ""' The reason for this addition
103. See infra notes 104-105 and accompanying text.
104. Act of May 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 122 (1790). The statute provided for the
authentication of acts, records, and judicial proceedings, and required any act,
record, or proceeding that was so authenticated to be given full faith and credit
in every state. Id.
105. Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
107. Id.
108. S. REP. No. 96-611, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3568.
109. Id.
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994).
111. Id.
950 [Vol. 38
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was that Congress found states were not according full faith
and credit to child support orders when the issuing state re-
tained the power to modify the order."2 The purpose of the
Child Support Act was to "facilitate the enforcement of child
support orders among the States... and to avoid jurisdic-
tional competition and conflict among State courts in the es-
tablishment of child support orders."'" With this addition,
states are now required to give child support orders full faith
and credit."'
In 1996, Congress enacted the third addition to the Full
Faith and Credit Act-the Defense of Marriage Act."' DOMA
does not require states to give full faith and credit to same
sex marriages performed in a sister state."'
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The Defense of Marriage Act was enacted as a reaction to
the possibility that same sex marriage might soon be legal-
ized in Hawaii.1 ' Part of DOMA's purpose is to clear up the
confusing issue of whether states must recognize such mar-
riages under the Full Faith and Credit Clause."8
This comment is concerned with Congress' power to use
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to allow states to disregard
valid acts or judicial proceedings of sister states. In effect,
DOMA allows States to ignore the Constitutional mandate
which requires a State to recognize the "acts, records, and ju-
dicial proceedings""9 of another state.2 '
Although the Effects Clause of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause authorizes Congress to enact legislation,' the ques-
tion remains, may Congress enact legislation permitting a
state to give no effect, instead of full effect, to another state's
acts or judicial proceedings?
112. S. REP. No. 103-361, at 4 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259,
3260.
113. Id. at 4.
114. Id. at 5.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996); see discussion supra Part II.B.
116. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-2.
117. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
118. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 2 (1996), reprinted in, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2906.
119. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1; See discussion supra Part II.C.
120. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
121. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
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IV. ANALYSIS
A. The Defense of Marriage Act Violates the Mandate of Full
Faith and Credit
1. DOMA Is in Violation of the Framers' Intent
The language of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is
clear: "Full faith and credit shall be given ... to the public
acts.., and judicial proceedings of every other state."2 The
notion of giving the acts and judgments of sister states only
some faith and credit was entertained at the Constitutional
Convention.'23 However, the clause, as finally adopted, shows
that notion was rejected. 124 The Framers, "in order to form a
more perfect union,"'25 saw fit to command the states to rec-
ognize each other's laws and judgments. 16
DOMA's pronouncement that "[n]o State... shall be re-
quired to give effect to ... a relationship between persons of
the same sex. . ,,."7 makes the Full Faith and Credit Clause
discretionary. This is not what the Framers contemplated. 8
The Framers, by changing the words "ought to" to "shall,' 9
sent a message that recognition of judgments is mandatory,
not discretionary. 0 DOMA runs contrary to that mandate by
allowing a state to give no faith and credit instead of full
faith and credit.131
In his commentary on the Constitution, Justice Story '32
observed that the Framers intended the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to "give each state a higher security and confi-
dence in the others, by attributing a superior sanctity and
conclusiveness to the public acts and judicial proceedings of
all." '3 Allowing anything less than full faith "could scarcely
consist with the peace of society, or with the interest and se-
122. STORY, supra note 79, at 485.
123. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
124. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
125. U.S. CONST. preamble.
126. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
127. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
128. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
129. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
130. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
131. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
132. See supra note 79.
133. See STORY, supra note 79, at 485.
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curity of individuals." 34
DOMA does none of the things Justice Story believes the
Framers intended.'35 DOMA does not require one state to
recognize the acts or judgments of another state; it gives
them a choice. 6 This choice, whether to abide by the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and recognize a judicial proceeding
of another state, violates the Framers' mandate of full recog-
nition of other state's judgments. 7  The Full Faith and
Credit Clause was not intended to allow states to choose
which acts or judgments to recognize; all acts and judgments
are to be recognized.'
As enacted, DOMA does not promote the interest or se-
curity of individuals, since a same sex couple may be legally
married in one state and cross into another state and sud-
denly not be married.39 This hinders an individual's consti-
tutional right to travel. " If same sex marriages are not ac-
knowledged in every state, Congress has, in effect, placed a
restriction on part of the population by not allowing them to
move freely.
However, assume that a same sex couple does travel to a
state that refuses to recognize their marriage. If there is an
accident, will one be able to visit the other in the hospital
since they are no longer "spouses?" Further, suppose a same
sex couple legally adopts a child in a state that recognizes
their marriage, what will happen if they then move to a state
which does not recognize their union? Is the child suddenly
"unadopted?" Will the state take the child away? Are they
no longer parents? These are examples of why DOMA does
not promote the interest or security of individuals, and actu-
ally creates conflict-something Congress sought to avoid
when enacting the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act' and
134. Id.
135. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
136. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 27 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2905, 2931.
137. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
138. See discussion supra Part II.C.1-2.
139. Individuals will not be secure by knowing that in order for them to be
legally married, they must only move to, or travel to another state which will
recognize their marriage.
140. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding that the right to
travel is inferred from various constitutional provisions).
141. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.
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the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act 4 2 un-
der the guise of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.'
Full faith and credit is required by the Constitution.
However, by permitting something less than "full" faith,
DOMA effectively reduces the Full Faith and Credit Clause
to surplusage. Since the Framers intended the clause to be
an integral part of the formation and continuation of this na-
tion,' any act, by any branch of government, that would re-
duce part of the Constitution to surplusage cannot be allowed
to stand. Congress' action of allowing states to disregard the
Constitution is necessarily an invalid use of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. In addition to violating the intentions of
the Framers, DOMA also runs contrary to the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
2. DOMA Violates Judicial Interpretation of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause
In Williams v. North Carolina,'46 the Court clarified the
purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause-to form one na-
tion where the laws and judicial proceedings of each state
would be given full recognition in every other state.47 In
Johnson v. Muelberger,48 the Court found the purpose of the
clause was to promote unification.'
However, DOMA does not weld this country into a
"single nation."15° DOMA divides the states into separate
sovereignties by allowing them to disregard the acts or pro-
ceedings of other states.' The Constitution is about unifica-
tion of the country, not fragmentation. DOMA's allowance of
less than full faith cannot be reconciled with the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The Constitutional mandate, and the Supreme Court's
interpretation of that mandate, is clear-full faith and credit
is to be given to the acts and judicial proceedings of each
142. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.
143. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.
144. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 (1942); see discussion su-
pra Parts II.C.1-2.
145. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
146. Williams, 317 U.S. at 287.
147. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
148. 340 U.S. 581 (1951).
149. Johnson, 340 U.S. at 585.
150. Williams, 317 U.S. at 295.
151. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-2.
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state.'52 By allowing states to disregard the judicial proceed-
ings of other states, DOMA violates that mandate and, there-
fore, is unconstitutional.
B. Congress Lacked Power Under the Effects Clause to Enact
DOMA
1. Congress Cannot Decide "If' the Full Faith and
Credit Clause Applies
From the wording of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it
can be argued that DOMA is constitutional because the
clause allows Congress to determine the effect of full faith. 5'
This is what Congress was doing when it enacted DOMA-
prescribing the effect states would have to give same sex
marriages.' DOMA simply states that any State "shall not
be required to give effect"55 to a same sex marriage per-
formed elsewhere.156 Therefore, Congress, by prescribing the
effect states must give same sex marriages, has used its
power to enact legislation under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause appropriately, and DOMA is constitutional.
However, while the language does allow Congress to en-
act legislation to enforce the Full Faith and Credit Clause, it
does not allow Congress the power to enact legislation as to
whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies. This is
really what Congress did when it enacted DOMA-it let each
state decide whether full faith and credit will apply." '
The Framers made their intention known that full faith
is to be given to all acts and judgments."8 They could not
have intended Congress to do anything under the clause
other than prescribe how acts, records, and judicial proceed-
ings are to be authenticated and how the clause is to apply to
the states."' The determination of if the clause applies is not
152. See discussion supra Parts II.C, IV.A.
153. See U.S. CONST. art IV, § 1 ("[T]he Congress may by general laws pre-
scribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be proved,
and the effect thereof.").
154. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-2.
155. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See discussion supra Parts II.C.1, IV.A.1.
159. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
1998] 955
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
"susceptible to any qualification by Congress."6 ' The lan-
guage of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is "positive, and
declaratory, leaving nothing to future legislation."'61  Con-
gress has no power to enact legislation that creates an excep-
tion to the constitutional mandate of full faith.
2. Previous Legislation Shows Congress Understands
Full Faith Is Required
The effects clause only "endows Congress to enact sup-
plementary and enforcing legislation."'62 The statutes Con-
gress has enacted under the clause, barring DOMA, show
that it understands these two concepts.'63 Both the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act 4 and the Full Faith and Credit
for Child Support Orders Act 6' specifically require full recog-
nition be given.'66 The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
requires that each state shall enforce the child custody de-
terminations of other states.167 The purpose of requiring the
states to recognize these determinations was to prevent
"conflict between State courts . ,, ." The Full Faith and
Credit for Child Support Orders Act also sought to end con-
flict between states in applying child support orders.169 Both
of these acts supplement and enforce the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, consistent with the Framers' intent.7 °
Unlike previous legislation, DOMA is neither supple-
mentary nor enforcing because it seeks to avoid and disre-
gard the Full Faith and Credit Clause entirely."' The legisla-
tive history shows that DOMA was enacted as a way around
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 72 The Framers could not
have intended Congress to decide when a provision of the
159. STORY, supra note 79, at 485.
161. Id.
162. CORWIN, supra note 94, at 373.
163. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.
164. The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
165. Full Faith and Credit For Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B
(1994).
166. See discussion supra Part II.C.5.
167. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994).
168. Id.
169. S. REP. No. 103-361, at 4 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3259,
3260.
170. See discussion supra Parts II.C.3, II.C.5.
171. See discussion supra Part II.B.1-2.
172. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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Constitution applies.
By seeking a way around the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, Congress has added an exception to the clause by al-
lowing States to give no faith and credit to the acts, records
or judicial proceedings of another state.'73 Congress does not
have the power to place limits on whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause applies; therefore, DOMA is unconstitutional.
V. PROPOSAL
A. Amending the Constitution
The legislative history of DOMA is clear. Congress en-
acted DOMA to address the issue of same sex marriage by
giving states a choice whether they must recognize such un-
ions.'74 However, Congress lacks the power to allow states to
make this choice under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
Under our present form of government, the only way that
Congress can enact legislation that limits the Full Faith and
Credit Clause is by amending the Constitution.176 This can be
accomplished in two ways. First, Congress can propose an
amendment that would bar same sex marriages, then the
states would need to ratify that proposal.1  The second way
to amend the Constitution would be for the legislatures of
two-thirds of the states to call a constitutional convention.
78
These options would, of course, take time to organize and ac-
complish. However, regardless of the time it takes, Congress
cannot be allowed to amend the Constitution, as it did by en-
acting DOMA, without following the process laid down by the
Framers. 9  Ultimately it will be up to the people of this
country to decide whether to recognize same sex marriages,
not Congress.
173. Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (1996); see discussion supra
Part II.B.1-2.
174. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
175. See discussion supra Parts IV.A-B.
176. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
177. Id. Congress' proposal must pass by a two-thirds vote of both Houses,
then three-fourths of the States must agree to adopt the proposal. Id.
178. Id. Once the convention is called, three-fourths of the States must
agree to adopt the proposal. Id.
179. See id.
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B. Congress Should Not Be Legislating in This Area
Amending the Constitution would be a drastic step to
take because two people wish to marry. The Constitution has
only been amended twenty-seven times.8 ' This raises the
question: is denying same sex marriage so important that
there is a need for a twenty-eighth amendment?
While amending the Constitution is certainly one way to
ensure same sex marriage will never be legal, a better solu-
tion would be to leave the decision up to the people and for
Congress to stay out of the area altogether.
It is interesting to note, and ironic as well, that Congress
wanted states to decide for themselves whether to recognize a
same sex marriage. 8' If this is true, then why did Congress
speak on the subject at all?' This is a decision the states
should be making alone.
The final determination of whether States will be re-
quired to recognize a same sex marriage, or whether same
sex marriages qualify for the public policy exception " under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, will no doubt end up in the
courts. The courts are in a better position to protect the
rights of minorities. Further, it is the responsibility of the
judiciary to interpret the Constitution, not Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Defense of Marriage Act represents a legislative re-
sponse to what Congress thought to be a growing national
problem-same sex marriage. While at one time parties
bringing claims for same sex marriage were not seen as a
threat, the Baehr case spurred Congress into enacting
DOMA. Whatever its motives for enacting it, this comment
has shown that what Congress has done is an unconstitu-
tional use of its legislative power. Not only does the very
idea of allowing states to give something less than full faith
to the acts or proceedings of sister states run contrary to the
Framers' intent, Congress does not have the power under the
effects clause to limit the amount of faith and credit that is to
be given to acts and judgments of sister states.
180. See U.S. CONST. amends. I-XXVII.
181. See discussion supra Parts II.B.1-2.
182. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 63.
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To allow Congress this power would be akin to allowing
it to amend the Constitution by statute. The Framers set up
a system of government that does not allow Congress the
power to change the Constitution without the states' help-a
system of checks and balances. Allowing DOMA to stand
would disrupt the federal system, and encourage Congress to,
by statute, amend the Constitution again for anything else it
found undesirable. This contradicts the Framers' intent, that
full faith and credit be given to the acts and judgments of sis-
ter states. Therefore, the Defense of Marriage Act is uncon-
stitutional.
James M. Patten

